Introduction
Community-based conservation (CBC) is a strategy used throughout the world as a means to save wildlife. It has its modern roots in the experience of conservationists working in poorer countries during the 1960s and 1970s. Conservationists came to realize that local people, who commonly are hostile to wildlife conservation, had to be won over as supporters of their efforts (World Conservation Union 1980; Parker 1982) ; they saw that without the cooperation of rural people, wildlife conservation efforts would be doomed. This is certainly true in Africa, where rural inhabitants often view wildlife conservation as misguided because it puts the needs of wildlife above those of people (e.g., Abrahamson 1983; Hackel 1990; Drummond 1993; McMeeklin 1994) . Although this response is primarily a reaction to people's present-day economic needs, it also has strong roots in the colonial legacy that alienated rural Africans from conservation efforts.
With colonialism, Africans faced restrictions from an outside authority that denied them the right to use resources as they saw fit. Policy was often based on a coercive form of protectionism that ignored the needs of African people (Metcalfe 1995) . Common elements included hunting restrictions, protected species designations, and game reserve establishment, which usually excluded people from protected areas (Carruthers 1993) .
Community-based conservation is a response to both alienating protectionist policies of the past and to the economic concerns that many rural people face (OwenSmith 1993) . Advocates of CBC argue that the approach can be effective because it harks back to pre-colonial African conservation practices that used community-based constraints to regulate resource use and is a means by which rural Africans will benefit materially from saving wildlife (McNeely & Pitt 1985; Metcalfe 1995) . Hence, the overall goal is to make rural people an integral part of conservation efforts .
In general, CBC programs do this in three ways: (1) allowing people living near protected lands to participate in land-use policy and management decisions; (2) giving people proprietorship or ownership over wildlife resources; and (3) giving local people economic benefit from wildlife conservation.
In its purest form, CBC would change the relationship between rural people and governing agencies. Its advocates stress that CBC is a bottom-up rather than a topdown approach: it changes the usual way of doing things by giving local people a strong voice in land-use decisions instead of having them imposed from above . Decentralization of resource management from the central authority to local communities is considered a linchpin for a successful CBC program. This emphasis on participatory democracy gives CBC a somewhat revolutionary character .
I examine some of the issues and problems in the implementation of CBC as a workable strategy in Africa. Although my discussion focuses primarily on wildlife conservation, CBC is being applied to many other natural resources. Moreover, although I accept that CBC is a crucial advance, I follow the lead of Little (1994) and Salafsky (1994) by taking a cautionary tone.
The central question is, can CBC do what its advocates hope, despite Africa's severe social, political, and economic problems? Although CBC is an important policy option in the effort to save African wildlife, I propose that it is being oversold and that the need for protectionism is being underestimated. I derived this position from reading the CBC literature, wherein the underlying assumption, stated or unstated, seems to be that implementation of a CBC program will automatically ensure adequate wildlife protection. Usually, little is said specifically about the extent or nature of the wildlife protection needed.
Hence, the literature on CBC has not satisfactorily dealt with the role of protectionism as a component of CBC or with what will be done if a CBC program fails to achieve its goals. No matter how much protection is needed, however, it cannot be the protection of the past. Consequently, CBC may offer the means by which old-style protectionist policies can be modified to work in today's Africa.
Community-Based Conservation in Context
Over the last two decades, Africa has faced numerous problems, including political instability, economic stagnation, and rapid population growth. Consequently, Africa has fallen behind other developing areas, and many Africans face deep poverty and an uncertain future (Abucar & Molutsi 1993) . Collectively, the problems add up to what has been characterized as ". . . a profound economic and environmental crisis" (World Resources Insti-tute 1996:88) . In rural areas, the predicament is particularly severe because rural production has gone through a two-decade period of per capita decline (World Resources Institute 1996) .
Access to land is a central issue in rural Africa for both farmers and pastoralists. Consequently, rural Africans generally do not want to give up land to wildlife or have wildlife nearby (Newmark et al. 1994) . Rural people's concerns focus on crop loss caused by animals, prohibited land access, and personal safety (Balakrishnan & Ndhlovu 1992 ). This is a major problem for conservation because wildlife and people have increasingly come to share the same lands or to exist in ever-closer proximity (World Resources Institute 1996) .
Population Growth and Land-Use Pressures
Africa's human population is 730 million. In 2025, it is projected to be 1.5 billion. A typical example of regional population growth comes from the Kajiado district of Kenya, where the population increased from approximately 15,000 in 1927 to over 250, 000 by 1989 000 by (Woodhouse 1997 . Accompanying the growth has been expansion of agricultural land and increased livestock numbers, resulting in increasing isolation of conservation areas and decreasing wildlife.
Although Africa's human population growth rate has moderated somewhat in recent years, it remains uniformly high over much of the continent (average 2.8%). The continent continues to have a persistently high total fertility rate of six (World Resources Institute 1996) . Because approximately 75% of Africans are rural, pressure to convert new areas to cropland and pasture remains high and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future (Pagiola et al. 1998) .
Cropland expansion has been a primary method by which Africa's agricultural production has increased (Cumming 1993; Cline-Cole 1997; Woodhouse 1997 ) and has been a major contributing factor in the loss of biodiversity (Pagiola et al. 1998) . From 1961 to 1990, 50% of the increased agricultural production has resulted from cultivating new areas, with a 5.8% increase in cropland occurring from 1981 to 1993. The specific rates vary somewhat by region, even within a country, but they are notably uniform for the continent as a whole (World Resources Institute 1996) . Moreover, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) expects the general trend to continue, although abated to some degree, and predicts that agricultural expansion will account for approximately 30% of Africa's increased crop production by 2010 (FAO 1995) .
Livestock populations are at 600 million head and increased by approximately 12% between 1981 (World Resources Institute 1996 . This can have significant effects on wildlife populations. In northern Kenya, for instance, as the number of pastoralists and their livestock has increased, there has been a loss of habitat for wildlife. As a result, species such as Grevy's zebra ( Equus greyvi ) are threatened (Williams & Ginsberg 1998) .
Consequently, wildlife conservationists are concerned about the conversion of rangeland, which can be shared with wildlife, to commercial ranches or agriculture. The trend has led to the isolation of protected lands as the land around them is transformed by human use (NortonGriffiths 1995) . This trend will continue (Cumming 1993) . Some of the conservation problems associated with people settling or using new areas are (1) disruption of ecological processes essential to maintain long-term biodiversity (for example, dispersal and colonization might become more difficult as habitat is transformed to human use); (2) increased hunting for home or market; and (3) increased pressure from local people to open protected lands for community use (Hackel 1990 (Hackel , 1993 Harris & Silva-Lopez 1992; Arcese et al. 1995) . Moreover, if land shortage increases as a social and economic problem, there is the likelihood that human conflicts will also increase (Scoones 1995) , a situation that is never good for wildlife conservation efforts.
Thus, it is likely that people will continue to settle and cultivate new areas as one of their primary responses to population growth and the need for land (Norton-Griffiths 1995). The solution is an economic reinvigoration of rural economies; rural people need to feel more secure in their economic lives. How this can happen is open to debate, and a plethora of prescriptions have been offered over the years. That rejuvenation will occur cannot be taken for granted (FAO 1995) , especially in light of the dismal rural development record in subSaharan Africa in the last 50 years.
The urbanization of Africa is gaining momentum. How this will affect rural areas is unknown. Urban Africans have tended to maintain strong ties to their rural areas, including the maintenance of homesteads. Because of these relationships between urban Africans and rural areas, it is impossible to say whether urbanization will alleviate pressure on rural areas or intensify demand for rural resources, including conversion of land to agriculture (Main 1995) .
Poverty
For rural Africans, poverty is an inescapable fact of life. Africa has experienced a protracted economic decline since the mid-1970s, with per capita income levels now similar to those of 30 years ago (Callaghy & Ravenhill 1993) . For sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 1992, the per capita GNP growth rate was Ϫ 1.83% per year, with only five countries achieving the rate (4.7%) needed to reduce the number of people living below the poverty level (Hope 1997) . House and Zimalirana (1992) , in a discussion specific to Malawi but applicable to African countries generally, list six factors that have led to poverty in Africa (modified from the original): (1) lack of employment opportunities; (2) low productivity of land and labor; (3) low levels of health, education, and training; (4) limited opportunities to own land; (5) low levels of government support to the most needy; and (6) high population growth that puts pressure on the physical environment and social services. Political corruption, bureaucratic bloat, and governmental policies that have stifled rural development can be added to the list.
Although there has been some recent macroeconomic improvement in Africa, there still has been little economic betterment in rural areas (Waters 1997) . Ravenhill (1993:18) states that "Africa's economic decline has proved to be more prolonged and much more difficult to reverse than originally foreseen . . . few signs of sustained economic recovery are apparent."
Whatever their specific situation, rural Africans have been forced to maneuver within the often narrow confines of their social and economic environment (Berry 1993; Zinyama 1995) . The priorities they set and the economic choices they are forced to make often lead to actions that are not compatible with wildlife conservation (Mortimer & Tiffen 1995) .
Democratization
Since the mid-1980s, African governments have been under internal and external pressure to implement democratic reforms (Luckham 1994) , with the majority of African countries having done so to some degree. Although the extent and character of democratization in African countries is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worthwhile to speculate on whether increased democracy will help or hinder community conservation projects. believe that democratization aids the development of CBC programs. They maintain that democratization, coupled with increased concern over grass-roots development and indigenous people's rights, is leading away from a conservation model that isolates protected areas from people to one that has "a heightened sensibility about the environment and the interests of local people" (Western & Wright 1994:6) . They argue that democratization has led to a loosening of governmental authority in rural areas, which in turn has enhanced rural people's control over their own resources. Hence, they see the spread of democracy as an opportunity for conservationists to build not only a better relationship between rural people and protected areas but also between rural people and the land in general.
If democratic reforms empower rural people, however, the consequences for CBC programs and wildlife conservation may not necessarily be positive, especially in light of Africa's persistent economic problems (Swatuk 1995) and the weak support for wildlife conservation efforts among rural Africans. Risks are inherent because CBC programs have to restrict people's economic choices (Hackel 1990; Cumming 1993; Owen-Smith 1993; Simbotwe 1993) , and it is possible that people will resist the narrowing of their options through democratic means.
Democracy can be a two-edged sword. Although democratization holds promise for rural empowerment, which theoretically could favor CBC, there is also the possibility that rural democracy will promote, through democratic means, the loss of land for wildlife as rural people gain a greater say in land-use decisions. Although it is too early to know what the outcome of the interaction between the democratic movement and CBC programs will be, conservationists must not assume that increased democracy, with its presumed attendant decentralization, will be beneficial to conservation efforts.
For instance, what would be the conservationist response if, as McCabe (1991) reports, the Masai of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area voted to reject a CBC project that had achieved its wildlife conservation goals but not its economic development goals?
Rural Africans face formidable economic pressure. Economic stagnation has produced widespread poverty and little incentive to change to a more intensified rural agriculture. Land remains people's primary asset and social security. Hence, with the growing population and continued economic uncertainty, the only solid prediction is that rural people will be trying to better themselves and that CBC programs will be working within an increasingly unpredictable social and economic environment.
Examples of Community-Based Conservation
I use case studies from Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Swaziland to illustrate some of the problems CBC programs face. Wright (1992) describes efforts to establish a national park in southeastern Madagascar that would link habitat protection with lemur ( Hapalemur simus and Hapalemur aureus ) survival. The Malagasy government, the World Bank, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) gave priority to the effort because it allowed them a chance to showcase a conservation project that combined rural development and wildlife conservation. The objective was to win local people's support for lemur conservation by showing them tangible gains from the conservation effort. The economic benefits initially came from the Malagasy government and outside agencies, who saw that people would accept the park only if they were better off economically as a result. Benefits include technical assistance in agriculture and forestry projects and improved health services and education (Wright 1992) .
Although project leaders want local people to benefit from the park as much as possible, it is clear that the park itself can provide only minimal revenue, even with an increase in ecotourism. The park will surely provide economic opportunities for local people, with ecotourism providing job opportunities and revenue (50% of park entrance fees go to village communities and 100% of campsite fees to village elders), but most of the money generated from ecotourism is ear-marked for park maintenance. Wright (1992:32) states that, "the future of this integrated conservation and development project rests on the abilities of the local people to accept and continue this program."
This program presents what is likely to be a common predicament for CBC programs. Conservationists see a problem and act to involve local people as a means to build a constituency. Long-term success is problematic, however, because local people are reacting to an outside initiative: the program considers the needs of local people primarily as a strategy to win their favor for the park, and enough money must be generated from tourism for local people to receive significant financial gain indefinitely.
Tourism is viewed as the critical ingredient, but it requires on-going promotion, facilities, and management flexibility if it is to succeed. One can question, however, whether sufficient jobs and money can be generated for local people to refrain from exploiting the park's resources. At present, there may be a growing over-reliance on tourism as the primary means to produce revenue for CBC programs.
One of the most often-cited examples of a CBC program is Zimbabwe's Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). It is a utilitarian wildlife program developed to appeal to local people. It gives them a voice in natural resource management decisions and a financial stake in the preservation of wildlife (Murphree 1993) . Large mammals are the key resource because most of the money generated comes from safari hunting fees (McCarthy 1994) . It is hoped that the program will eventually come to include as income generators such resources as forestry and livestock production; moreover, conservationists would like to see all natural resources fall under the management plan (Metcalfe 1994 ).
Zimbabwe's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management developed CAMPFIRE. Fortuitously, it fit with President Mugabe's desire to decentralize the management of rural resources. The program has been implemented over other competing options, including settlement and intensive agriculture (Murphree 1993 ). Thus, although there is broad support for the program, it is far from universal; advocates for other land uses options wait in the wings.
What would happen to the program if support for it declined because arguments for intensified agricultural or increased settlement began to resonate with local people, as some believe will eventually happen? It would be difficult for CAMPFIRE to remain a viable wildlife conservation program (Murphree 1993; Murphy 1998) , which would be a predicament for conservationists because CAMPFIRE has as its foundation "the assumed right of communities' group proprietorship over 'their' resources" (Metcalfe 1994:190 ). Could conservationists then lobby for a more protectionist wildlife policy, despite their previous commitments to local control of resources? More generally, what would happen to CBC programs if they fail to conserve? Although this question is applicable to CBC programs overall, it has not been addressed adequately in the CBC literature.
In northcentral Ethiopia, Campbell (1991) examined afforestration efforts. In this case, the rhetoric of local control was used, but the reality was that local people contributed little to forest-use policy. Campbell (1991) shows that, under the guise of community forestry, the forests have been turned into government lands, with the government setting policy that reduces people's land-use options. He argues that, in the name of community forestry, conservation projects restrict local people's access to needed land, which has produced land shortages and overuse. Thus, Campbell (1991) believes that conservation projects work against rural people, even though the rhetoric that accompanies the projects emphasizes local control and long-term benefits.
This case illustrates the division that can occur between the rhetoric and the reality of CBC: it is easier to advocate CBC than to implement it. Consequently, support for CBC often comes without an appreciation of how difficult it is to produce a program that successfully weds wildlife conservation and people's economic needs. Thus, as Salafsky (1994) illustrates with the term biodiversity , community-based conservation may be a concept that is losing its coherence as people define it for their own purposes. Soon it may be difficult to find a rural conservation project that does not define itself as community-based. It is doubtful, however, that many of them are, except in the most superficial ways. As CAMP-FIRE illustrates, even when the foundation for CBC is solid and well thought out, success is hard-won (Metcalfe 1994).
The case study in northeastern Swaziland illustrates how a country's economic development priorities, including those of rural people, may hinder efforts to establish a CBC program. The 1980s brought rapid population growth and development to northeastern Swaziland as commercial agricultural estate development, infrastructure improvements, and a complex of nature reserves were established. The nature reserves form Swaziland's most significant protected area. Rural people's economic aspirations, however, make it difficult to establish an effective CBC program. People give land access and economic development highest pri-ority because each puts them on the path to economic security. Consequently, most rural Swazi want some protected areas opened for settlement or projects that will produce jobs (Hackel 1993 ). They do not favor the land being used for wildlife protection because they believe it is wrong to place the needs of wildlife above those of people, a common African viewpoint.
The dilemma for conservationists is the broad support that all segments of the Swazi population give to commercial developments over nature conservation (Hackel 1990 ). It is difficult to see how the reserves could ever provide enough financial benefit to offset local people's land-use preferences, which are strongly linked to their perceived long-term economic needs.
Flexibility of Community-Based Conservation
For CBC to succeed it needs to be flexible enough to cope with a countryside inhabited by a growing number of extremely poor people who depend on a subsistence existence and whose greatest goal is to gain economic security. The dilemma is that even the most enlightened programs, if wildlife conservation is to be a priority, must reduce people's land-use options forever because large areas of natural habitat must be preserved. This reality makes the widespread implementation of CBC programs problematic. Goodland (1982) characterizes policies that restrict people's response to changing circumstances as forced primitivism; that is, they must remain doing what they are doing. He believes that this may be a problem when the needs of wildlife are emphasized over the needs of people because it reduces people's ability to adjust to new circumstances. Wilkie et al. (1991) support this viewpoint based on their experience with foragers and farmers in the Congo basin. They believe that balancing human and conservation needs will be difficult because programs that require people to maintain land uses deemed to be more or less traditional, or conducive to sustaining wildlife populations, may not give local people the flexibility they need to adapt to demographic and economic developments.
Norton-Griffiths (1995), while referring to the Masai living in proximity to the Serengeti, addresses this issue and the problem it poses for conservationists. He believes that maintaining traditional lifestyles and value systems among ethnic groups may produce a poverty trap. Moreover, he finds that young Masai want change. He believes that there will be a conversion of rangeland to agricultural and that the Masai will develop their land at the expense of wildlife.
For conservationists, then, it will require the greatest skill and flexibility to maintain CBC programs because it is likely that over time rural people will view the conservation-oriented practices they work under as too restrictive. Hence, conservationists will find it difficult to fashion programs that meet the needs of both people and wildlife (Snelson 1995) .
The Reality of Community-Based Conservation
Community-based conservation programs are a more realistic policy in areas that have big game animals-for example, in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program, Zambia's Administrative Management Design for Game Management, and Kenya's Amboseli National Park. The ability to draw hunters or tourists in sufficient numbers is the key element. Each of these programs has an operational history of several years, and each has succeeded to some degree in working cooperatively with local people. It is not as likely, however, that such programs can be applied generally in rural Africa for the following reasons.
First, areas without big game animals will not have the revenue-generating potential required for conservationbased projects that rely on revenue sharing because there will be insufficient financial reward. Second, even in those areas where there is big game, there is the danger that communities will eventually reject the project. The amount of revenue received by the community may eventually be considered too low. For example, in Kenya there is presently an incentive for the Masai living in the Mara area to convert their land to agriculture and ranching because of the difference between their current and potential revenue. Norton-Griffiths (1995) estimates that the ratio between what the Masai now receive from traditional livestock management, tourism, and agriculture to what they could receive if the land was used to its full agricultural potential is between 1:3 and 1:23, depending on land quality. Consequently, he questions a policy for rangelands that is based on a mix of traditional livestock management and tourism. It would not produce enough revenue to halt development.
Clearly, the economic link between rural communities and CBC programs poses both a serious practical and a conceptual problem. First, it will be difficult to produce enough revenue; second, CBC programs put a price on wildlife that can be compared to revenue that might be received from other activities (Geist 1988) . If a rural community accepts a CBC program based on its economic benefits, they might also reject it if a better economic alternative comes along. And if rural people cannot pursue economic options that would bring them greater income, then they are in fact still subsidizing wildlife conservation. In economic terms, this is an opportunity cost, which is defined as the cost of lost economic opportunities (Owen & Chiras 1995) . Rural people may eventually perceive that they have an opportunity cost because they are forgoing the possibility of greater economic gain to maintain wildlife. If this scenario proves true, conservationists would face the same problem that produced the CBC approach in the first place: rural people may feel that the restrictions that they must bear to save wildlife are costing them too much.
Third, the widespread application of CBC programs requires significant changes in the relationship between central governments and rural areas. believes the CBC approach calls for great reforms in landuse policy. He believes that if the conservation focus is to switch to the community, the focus must change from a top-down to a bottom-up approach: he states that this "is where community-based conservation becomes more revolutionary than evolutionary: Such changes call for nothing less than a turnaround in entrenched political norms" (Western 1994:553) . goes on to list several other changes that would have to take place, including a reduction in factionalism, greater cooperation among those with a stake in conservation efforts, and negation of such agreements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) unless they are sensitive to local environmental concerns.
As Callaghy and Ravenhill point out (1993) , it is not likely that such profound changes will occur in Africa any time soon. Little (1994) discusses the realities that could work against CBC in the foreseeable future, including (1) central governments that maintain policymaking power and allow only administrative authority to devolve to rural areas; (2) local participation that is difficult and time-consuming to administer; (3) difficulty in recognizing the most appropriate community members for program participation (e.g., men or women?); (4) participatory community-based conservation that is ineffective in combating the environmental problems that produce wildlife conservation problems; (5) constant monitoring and evaluation needed to see if the program's objectives are being met; and (6) local conservation efforts that cannot escape national or global politics.
Thus, the requirement for a "revolutionary" change in the relationship between rural areas and the outside world, coupled with the already ambitious goal of linking conservation and development, makes it problematic that CBC can be widely applied as a wildlife conservation model in Africa's rural areas.
Role of Protectionism
In Africa the overwhelming trend is that core protected areas (e.g., national parks) are becoming ecologically isolated as people populate the countryside. If this trend continues unabated, one can expect the worst-case scenario: the core areas deteriorate as the land around them is transformed to a human-dominated landscape. Over time wildlife is lost from the countryside and the core areas themselves are lost. If the present trend is modified, one can also envision a more optimistic scenario: a new environmental relationship is forged between rural people and the land, largely based on principles of community-based conservation. The result is sustainable development in the countryside and the maintenance of biodiversity not only in the core areas but also in the countryside as a whole.
The most realistic scenario is one that lies between these two but nearer the pessimistic side (Strum 1994) . This raises the issue of where protection fits in the CBC model. In other words, is the level of habitat protection needed to save a remnant of Africa's wildlife assured if a CBC program is implemented? Specific discussions are missing from the CBC literature.
Advocates of community-based conservation seem to assume that rural people, because they receive benefit, will accept and promote whatever level of protection is needed as a by-product of the program or that the level of benefits can be increased to meet the community's satisfaction. These include, besides monetary gain, access to renewable resources, recreational opportunities (as of yet not a major factor in Africa), and ecological benefit (Munro 1995) .
Buffer zones around protected areas illustrate the nature of the protectionist issue. Buffer zones have a dual function: they protect the core area and provide resources for people. Hence, buffer zones are usually considered ideal places for CBC. Yet to fulfill their conservation function, managers of buffer-zones would have to place such severe restrictions on people's activities and benefits that it becomes difficult to see how they actually could be participatory enough to qualify as CBC programs (Little 1994) .
This dilemma highlights the fact that protectionism is still at the core of African conservation efforts and that the role of protectionism in CBC must be carefully considered during the initial stages of program design. Both conservationists and local people must be clear about the goals of conservation and about what will happen if a CBC program fails to achieve them.
Conclusion
Community-based conservation programs that presently exist do not have a long operational history, so it is impossible to evaluate them rigorously (Newmark et al. 1994 ). Nevertheless, CBC represents an advance over past practices that ignored rural people. Yet the widespread application of CBC programs in Africa is questionable because of rapid human population growth and widespread poverty. It is doubtful that the economic return to rural people from CBC programs can be high enough that people will not eventually look for economic alternatives. The tools that make up CBC programs rather than the programs themselves will prove to have the most practical value in rural Africa.
Community-based conservation programs have as their goal the transformation of the relationship between rural people and the environment, and they draw upon natural resources to produce revenue for local communities . As such, CBC is both a wildlife conservation and an economic development program, with all the complexity inherent in such an effort. Clearly, the programs are exceedingly difficult to administer, and the simultaneous achievement of social, economic, and conservation goals is problematic.
On the other hand, if CBC is thought of simply as a set of tools that serve to promote greater acceptance of conservation efforts by rural people, the ends become more realistic (Pagiola et al. 1998) . Such tools include, among many others, environmental education, local people's involvement in management, regulated access to protected lands, compensation for protecting biodiversity, and compensation from such activities as hunting and tourism.
Instead of conservationists trying to implement unrealistically complex programs, they should use the most appropriate CBC tools to build better relations with rural people. In areas less critical to wildlife, the balance between benefit and protection can be tilted toward the former; in critically important areas, however, CBC tools can be used as much as possible to ameliorate the restrictions people must endure. Conservationists will not be successful all the time. To believe that CBC can do more than this is to set up the programs for failure. Community-based conservation programs cannot fundamentally change the deteriorating situation for wildlife in Africa when people's economic needs are so great.
The social and economic reality in Africa will test the skills of conservationists because each conservation strategy must be site-specific, with conservationists required to mix protectionism with any CBC tools that might work in a particular situation. Finding a successful mix will require much flexibility. What will work will not likely be predictable at the outset, and success will have to be measured in small increments.
The trend toward an increasingly human-dominated landscape will continue in Africa, with larger mammals increasingly restricted to parks and reserves. In those areas where people and wildlife coexist, the coexistence will continue to be uneasy. To succeed, wildlife conservation policy will have to be a mix of protectionism, community involvement, public relations, conservation education, and revenue sharing. Hence, it is the creative application of the inclusive philosophy of communitybased conservation rather than the CBC programs themselves that will likely to be of the greatest practical value in Africa.
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